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 EXECUTIVE REVISION OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
 I. INTRODUCTION: EXTRADITION AND THE EXERCISE OF
 BENIGN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
 On February 2, I992, veteran Chicago police officers Anthony Lo-
 bue and Thomas Kulekowskis traveled to Canada on an unusual er-
 rand. Two attorneys had approached Lobue and Kulekowskis to assist
 their client in retrieving his physically and mentally disabled wife from
 her parents' home in Winnipeg.' The attorneys assured them that
 their client's wife, Tammy, had been declared incompetent, that their
 client was Tammy's legal guardian, and that an Illinois judge had au-
 thorized their- client to repatriate her.2 Lobue and Kulekowskis agreed
 on the condition that the attorneys first seek advice from the Cana-
 dian police, who responded that the dispute was not a "police mat-
 ter."3 Their expedition ended in failure when Tammy's mother
 reported that her daughter had been kidnapped and Canadian authori-
 ties stopped the group at the border. Tammy returned to Winnipeg,
 and Lobue and Kulekowskis returned to Chicago to face extradition
 proceedings.4 Pursuant to the extradition procedure set forth by fed-
 eral statute, a federal magistrate certified the two men extraditable,
 and the Secretary of State issued surrender warrants against them.6 In
 response, Lobue and Kulekowskis alleged that, by authorizing the Sec-
 retary of State to review the determinations of an Article m court, the
 extradition statute violated the separation of powers.7 The district
 court for the District of Columbia agreed and declared the I48-year-
 old statute unconstitutional.
 1 See Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D.D.C. I995), vacated, Nos. 95-5293 & 95-
 5315, I996 WL 20648i (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, I996); Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees at i, Lobue v.
 Christopher, Nos. 95-5293 & 95-5315, I996 WL 20648i (D.C. Cir. I996).
 2 See Brief of the Plaintiffs-Appellees at i, Lobue (Nos. 95-5293 & 95-5315).
 3 Id.
 4 See id. at 2.
 5 See i8 U.S.C. ?? 3i8i-3i96 (I994).
 6 See Lobue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65, 67 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated, Nos. 95-5293 & 95-
 5315, I996 WL 20648i (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, i996).
 7 See id. at 70-7I.
 8 See id. at 78. The D.C. Circuit vacated the judgment on the ground that the district court
 lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the extraditees' declaratory judgment action as long as
 habeas corpus relief was available elsewhere. See Lobue v. Christopher, Nos. 95-5293 & 95-53I5,
 1996 WL 20648i, at *i (D.C. Cir. Apr. 30, I996). The district court's decision in Lobue has met
 with skepticism from other federal courts. See, e.g., In re Lang, 905 F. Supp. 1385, 1390-I401
 (C.D. Cal. I995); In re Lin, 915 F. Supp. 206, 21I-15 (D. Guam 1995); In re Sutton, 905 F. Supp.
 63i, 634-37 (E-D. Mo. i995).
 2020
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 Under the extradition statute, extradition cannot occur unless a
 judge first certifies that the individual is extraditable.9 If the extradi-
 tion judge finds that the requirements of applicable substantive law
 are met, the judge certifies this finding together with the evidence to
 the Secretary of State, who is then authorized to issue a surrender
 warrant but may decline to do so.10 The statutory scheme thus sets
 forth a "'dual key' mechanism"" under which both the judiciary and
 the executive must concur in the decision to extradite. The checking
 function that the judiciary performs under the extradition statute com-
 ports with the separation of powers insofar as it prevents the executive
 from acting unilaterally to deprive individuals of their liberty.12 The
 executive enjoys unchecked discretion, however, to decline to extradite.
 Extradition procedure thus suggests a conceptual category of cases in
 which the executive exercises what might be described as benign dis-
 cretion - discretion that benefits a losing party at the expense of the
 governments
 This Note uses the concept of benign executive discretion to ex-
 plore the nature and scope of the rule against executive revision of
 judicial decisions. It suggests two ways in which benign executive dis-
 cretion subsequent to judicial decisions might be conceptualized to
 avoid separation of powers difficulties. Part II provides a brief history
 of the rule against executive revision. Part III suggests two related
 explanations for the rule and questions whether the rule can accom-
 plish its purposes. Part IV then explores the notion that benign execu-
 tive discretion may be understood simply as a means by which the
 government may waive the benefit of a judgment in its favor. Part V
 considers whether benign executive discretion may be constitutionally
 9 See Lobue, 893 F. Supp. at 67468. The extradition statute authorizes federal magistrates
 and certain state court judges as well as Article III judges to act as extradition judges. See i8
 U.S.C. ? 3184 (I994).
 10 Courts have interpreted the statute as authorizing the executive to decline to extradite on
 legal or other grounds, and the executive has in fact declined on numerous occasions. See Lobue,
 893 F. Supp. at 69-70; Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313 pas-
 sim (I962).
 11 Brief for the Appellants at 47, Lobue v. Christopher, Nos. 95-5293 & 95-5315, I996 WL
 20648i (D.C. Cir. I996).
 12 The Court periodically approaches separation of powers questions from a functional
 "checks-and-balances" perspective that looks to whether a particular scheme maintains tension
 and interdependence among the branches, such as by denying any one branch the ability to act
 unilaterally. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Pow-
 ers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578, 6i6-21 (I984).
 13 Benign discretion may cease to be "benign," of course, if the executive exercises it in a
 discriminatory or self-interested fashion; the systemic abuse of such discretion may give rise to a
 constitutional violation independent of the separation of powers. For instance, concerned with
 accounts of mistreatment of female prisoners by foreign nations, the executive might exercise its
 discretion to extradite only male defendants. A male defendant facing extradition might challenge
 such an exercise of ostensibly benign discretion by alleging an equal protection violation of the
 kind found in such cases as Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
 319-20 (1978), and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, ii8 U.S. 356, 366-74 (i886).
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 justified by analogy to the pardon power. Finally, Part VI addresses
 the justiciability of challenges to benign executive discretion.
 II. ORIGINS OF THE RULE AGAINST EXECUTIVE REVISION
 The Supreme Court has declared as a general principle that "Con-
 gress cannot vest review of the decisions of Article m courts in offi-
 cials of the Executive Branch,"14 a principle that it has attributed to
 the opinions expressed in Hayburn's Case.15 At stake in that case was
 the constitutionality of the Invalid Pensions Act of I792,16 which di-
 rected the federal circuit courts to entertain the pension applications of
 injured Revolutionary War veterans."7 If the court found that a claim-
 ant qualified under the statute, the statute directed the court to submit
 this finding to the Secretary of War.18 Notwithstanding a judicial de-
 termination of eligibility, the statute authorized the Secretary of War
 to withhold a pension if he suspected "imposition or mistake."'9
 Although the Court itself never addressed the validity of the statute, a
 footnote to the decision set forth the opinions of the Justices in their
 capacity as circuit judges.20
 Each of the circuit courts to address the validity of the Invalid
 Pensions Act rested its conclusion squarely upon the separation of
 powers. In refusing to act upon William Hayburn's claim for a pen-
 sion, the Pennsylvania circuit court explained that, if it were to pro-
 ceed under the statute, its "judgments" would be subject to "revision
 and controul . . . radically inconsistent with the independence of that
 judicial power which is vested in the courts; and, consequently, with
 that important principle which is so strictly observed by the Constitu-
 tion of the United States."21 The New York circuit court observed
 that "neither the Legislative nor the Executive branches, can constitu-
 14 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., II5 S. Ct. I447, I453 (I995) (citing Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S.
 (2 Dall.) 409 (I792)).
 15 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (I792). For discussion of Hayburn's Case and its unusual procedural
 background, see RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART &
 WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 99-IO4 (4th ed. i996) [hereinaf-
 ter HART & WECHSLER], and Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir, Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation
 of Precedent, i988 WIS. L. REv. 527 passim.
 16 Act of Mar. 23, I792, ch. ii, I Stat. 243 (repealed in part and amended by Act of Feb. 28,
 I793, ch. I7, I Stat. 324).
 17 See id. ? 2, I Stat. at 244.
 18 See id.
 19 Id. ? 4, I Stat. at 244.
 20 The actual decision of the Court was to deny the Attorney General's motion to appear ex
 officio in order to seek a writ of mandamus directing the Pennsylvania circuit court to act on
 William Hayburn's petition for a pension. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 409-IO; Mar-
 cus & Teir, supra note Is, at 534-4I. The judges of the circuit courts expressed their opinions on
 the validity of the statute in the form of letters to President Washington, which were subsequently
 reprinted in a footnote to the Court's decision. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 4io n.t;
 Marcus & Teir, supra, at 529-34.
 21 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 4I-I2 n.t.
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.158 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 01:19:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 I 996] EXECUTIVE REVISION OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 2023
 tionally assign to the Judicial any duties, but such as are properly
 judicial, and to be performed in a judicial manner."22 It concluded
 that the duties assigned by the statute were not judicial because any
 decisions rendered would be subject to "consideration and suspension"
 by the Secretary of War.23 The North Carolina circuit court shared
 these sentiments: "inasmuch as the decision of the court is not made
 final, but may be at least suspended in its operation by the Secretary
 at War ... this subjects the decision of the court to a mode of revision
 . . .unwarranted by the Constitution."24
 Notwithstanding the absence of an actual decision on the merits in
 Hayburn's Case, the Supreme Court has subsequently confirmed the
 existence of a constitutional rule against executive revision of judicial
 decisions. In United States v. Ferreira,25 the Court considered a series
 of enactments that directed federal judges to "receive and adjudicate"
 the claims of Spanish citizens in proceedings to recover war losses
 from the United States.26 The statute provided that the judge was to
 determine an award and transmit this decision along with the evidence
 taken to the Secretary of the Treasury, who was to pay the claim only
 if he found it "just and equitable" to do SO.27 Relying at length on
 Hayburn's Case,28 the Court concluded that the duties conferred by
 the act were "not judicial . . . in the sense in which judicial power is
 granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States."29
 Nearly a century later, in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman
 Steamship Corp. 30 the Court addressed the proper construction of a
 statute providing for judicial review of administrative orders authoriz-
 ing air carriers to operate overseas routes.31 Rejecting an interpreta-
 tion that gave the President the power to review judicial
 determinations, the Court asserted "the firm and unvarying practice of
 Constitutional Courts to render no judgments not binding and conclu-
 sive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or altera-
 22 Id. at 4io n.t.
 23 Id. To save what it deemed an "exceedingly benevolent" act of Congress, the New York
 circuit court chose to read the statute as appointing judges to act as commissioners - an appoint-
 ment the judges promptly accepted. Id.
 24 Id. at 4I3 n.t. Each of the courts also suggested, without explanation, that the statute
 subjected judicial decisions to legislative as well as executive revision. See id. at 4IO-I3 n.t.
 2s 54 U.S. ('3 How.) 40 (i85I).
 26 Id. at 45.
 27 Id. at 46-47.
 28 See id. at 49-52.
 29 Id. at 48. Taking the approach of the New York circuit court in Hayburn's Case, see supra
 note 23, the Court construed the statute as directing judges to decide such claims in their capacity
 not as judges, but as commissioners appointed especially for that purpose. The Court held that it
 lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals from such nonjudicial decisions. See Ferreira, 54 U.S. (IW
 How.) at 47.
 30 333 U.S. I03 (I948).
 31 See id. at I04-06.
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 tion by administrative action."32 On similar grounds, the Court has
 also concluded that Congress cannot engage in legislative revision of
 judicial decisions33 or direct courts to reopen final judgments.34
 m. Two RELATED EXPLANATIONS OF THE
 RULE AGAINST EXECUTIVE REVISION
 Unlike the situation posed by the extradition statute, those cases in
 which the Court has rejected executive or legislative revision of judi-
 cial decisions have involved the possibility that the government could
 deny a litigant the benefit of a favorable judicial decision. Whether
 the general rule against interbranch revision of judicial decisions also
 prohibits purely benign discretion requires some understanding of
 what the Court sought to protect in Hayburn's Case and its progeny.
 The rule against executive revision has helped the Court to define a
 particular role for the judiciary in the constitutional scheme - a role
 defined, in the grand tradition of Marbury v. Madison,35 by the simul-
 taneous assertion and rejection of judicial power.
 A. Judicial Refusal to Serve as an Adjunct
 to the Executive Branch
 Viewed as a denial of judicial power, the rule against executive
 revision might be understood as part of the Court's early efforts to
 rebuff extrajudicial service36- efforts that, in turn, may have fueled
 the growth of non-Article III adjudication. In the absence of a mod-
 ern-day Veterans' Administration and prior to the advent of adminis-
 trative law judges, the federal judiciary must have appeared to
 Congress an obvious candidate to perform the work of determining
 pension eligibility - the sort of task now commonly performed by
 non-Article III bodies. The Court may have been motivated by a
 structural concern to prevent use of the judiciary as an adjunct to the
 executive branch. Thus viewed, the early articulation of a rule against
 executive revision may have had broad consequences for the present:
 at the same time that the Court's limited approval of non-Article HI
 adjudication removed a significant obstacle to the development of the
 32 Id. at I I3-I4.
 33 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (i8 How.) 42I, 43I
 (i856) ("[An] act of congress cannot have the effect and operation to annul the judgment of the
 court already rendered, or the rights determined thereby ....").
 34 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., II5 S. Ct. I447, I453-63 (I995); infra p. 2032.
 35 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I37 (i803).
 36 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note Is, at I03 (suggesting as a "connecting theme"
 between Hayburn's Case and other early refusals to perform extrajudicial service that "judicial
 independence requires that the Article Iml courts not be subject to enlistment by Congress or the
 Executive to act as subordinates to those two branches in the performance of their characteristic
 functions"); Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, I973 SUP. CT.
 REV. I23 passim (recounting various efforts of the Court to avoid extrajudicial service and noting
 the general belief that Hayburn's Case precluded such service).
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 modern administrative state, judicial refusal to participate in statu-
 tory schemes of the type in Hayburn's Case may have ensured that
 growth in the federal administrative apparatus would occur within the
 executive branch, not the judicial branch. Even prior to the New
 Deal, the Court had held that "a mere administrative decision" could
 not constitute "a judgment binding parties in a case" within the mean-
 ing of Article 111,38 and it has since reiterated that "executive or ad-
 ministrative duties of a nonjudicial nature" may not be imposed on
 Article III judges.39
 The relationship between the rule against executive revision and
 the growth of non-Article III adjudication may reflect a general ten-
 sion between the judiciary's need to protect itself from encroachment
 and its interest in avoiding service as an adjunct to the executive:40
 the more adjudicative work the judiciary refuses, the more Congress
 must delegate such work to non-Article III tribunals. Congress and
 the Court may thus bear joint responsibility for the growth of non-
 Article III adjudication: at the same time that Congress has sought for
 policy reasons to assign adjudicative work to non-Article III tribu-
 nals41 and to maintain political controls over such adjudication,42 the
 Court's resistance to interference with judicial decisions may also have
 caused Congress to assign such work to non-Article III tribunals.43
 Although the Court's interest in preventing interference with judicial
 decisions may be seen as the product of its broader interest in protect-
 ing itself from encroachment, the two interests combine to create an
 uneasy equilibrium: non-Article Im adjudication may provoke the judi-
 ciary's fear of encroachment, but expansion of the judiciary into areas
 37 See infra note 44 (discussing the public rights doctrine).
 38 Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693, 698-99 (I927). Under the
 statutory scheme then in effect, patent and trademark decisions of the Court of Appeals of the
 District of Columbia lacked any binding effect in subsequent suits challenging the validity of a
 patent or trademark. See id. The Supreme Court characterized such decisions as "mere adminis-
 trative decisions" from which no appeal could lie. Id. at 698.
 39 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677 (i988) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, I23
 (I976) (per curiam) (citing United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. W3 How.) 40 (i852), and Hayburn's
 Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (I792))).
 40 See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (i982)
 (plurality opinion) (holding that Congress's creation of non-Article m bankruptcy courts violated
 Article III).
 41 See Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
 Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 236-40, 26i-63 (I990).
 42 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note I2, at 586-95 (describing the various political controls exer-
 cised over administrative agencies). A prominent case in which Congress attempted to exercise
 control over the outcome of non-Article Ill adjudication is INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 9I9 (i983), in
 which the Court struck down a statutory provision authorizing either house of Congress to repu-
 diate by resolution an executive finding that an individual qualified for a compassionate suspen-
 sion of deportation. See id. at 923-28. The Court held the provision invalid for failure to satisfy
 the Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment. See id. at 944-59.
 43 Cf Bator, supra note 4I, at 237 & n.io (describing the use of specialized tribunals to per-
 form "advisory and administrative functions of a sort that could not be delegated to an article III
 court").
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 of specialized or advisory adjudication runs afoul of the judiciary's
 refusal to serve as an adjunct, which in turn leads the Court to accept
 non-Article III adjudication.44
 B. Judicial Assertion of Power to Vindicate the Interests of
 Successful Litigants
 Viewed as an assertion of judicial power, the rule against executive
 revision prevents the executive from interfering with the judiciary's
 ability to vindicate the rights of individuals. In the absence of limits
 on executive or legislative revision, the government could force liti-
 gants into an intolerable no-win situation: if a litigant were to lose in
 court, she would lose once and for all, but even if she were to win in
 court, she might still lose at the discretion of the political branches.
 For example, under the statutes at issue in Hayburn's Case and Fer-
 reira, the courts could not declare that successful claimants enjoyed
 any right to an award. Because the only judgments with "binding and
 conclusive" effect45 were those rendered against the claimant and in
 favor of the government, the statutes relegated the courts to the role of
 screening claims against the government and of placing the imprima-
 tur of an impartial judiciary on the government's refusals to pay. In
 such situations, a court cannot "decide on the rights of individuals";46
 it can decide only that individuals have no rights. Any other decision
 44 This uneasy equilibrium may help to explain the persistence and expansion of the public
 rights doctrine, under which suits against the government for "money, lands or other things," Ex
 parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929), or arising under a public regulatory scheme, see
 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (i985), need not be heard by Arti-
 cle III courts but may be committed to the executive or legislative branches. See, e.g., Bator,
 supra note 4I, at 246-53; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
 and Article III, ioi HARV. L. REV. 9I5, 95I-53 (i988); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the
 Federal Judicial Power: From Murray's Lessee Through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REV. 765
 passim (i986). If the judiciary is unwilling to subject itself to the bureaucratic or political controls
 - such as executive revision - that accompany the role currently filled by legislative courts and
 administrative agencies, it may have no choice but to embrace the existence of a category of cases
 that can be heard by non-Article HI tribunals.
 Considered in a positive light, the combination of the public rights doctrine and the rule
 against executive revision may have the particular virtue of preserving both judicial reach over a
 broad range of disputes and judicial autonomy without requiring the judiciary to enforce and rely
 upon a formalistic and blurry distinction between executive and judicial functions. For example,
 instead of acknowledging that certain disputes may be committed to either executive or judicial
 resolution, the Court could opt to protect its independence by insisting on a strict separation of
 the executive and judicial functions and rejecting altogether the notion of concurrent judicial and
 executive authority over particular types of disputes. Such an approach would insulate the judici-
 ary from the executive, however, only at the dramatic expense of both executive reach over dis-
 putes committed to the judiciary and judicial reach over disputes committed to the executive. By
 conditioning judicial resolution of cases capable of executive resolution upon a guarantee that
 such decisions will not be subject to executive revision, the rule against executive revision enables
 the judiciary to protect itself from executive domination without having to commit particular
 types of disputes to the exclusive resolution of either branch.
 45 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. I03, II4 (I948).
 46 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) I37, I70 (i803).
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 is open to revision. Executive and legislative revision conspire in such
 cases to make a farce of the judicial power.
 In rare cases, courts may lack the legal authority to compel the
 other branches to honor judicially declared rights. In this unusual
 context, the Court has articulated a flexible test of Article III power
 that focuses on whether successful litigants stand to benefit from its
 exercise. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,47 the Court upheld the Article Ill
 status of the Court of Claims despite the inability of that court to en-
 force its money judgments against the United States.48 Having ob-
 served that no court could compel Congress to exercise its exclusive
 power under the Appropriations Clause to honor money judgments
 against the United States,49 Justice Harlan's plurality opinion
 pragmatically insisted only that successful litigants could collect such
 judgments as a matter of practice. Given Congress's nearly perfect
 record of honoring money judgments against the United States,50 pro-
 ceedings before the Court of Claims were demonstrably not an exercise
 in futility for litigants, and the Court of Claims could thus be deemed
 an Article m court.
 Although Justice Harlan characterized the problem in Glidden as
 one of the enforceability of judgments, the problem can be recast as
 one of legislative revision: by refusing to exercise its appropriations
 power, Congress could effectively revise money judgments against the
 United States by refusing to honor them in part or in whole. To re-
 solve this formally intractable problem of legislative revision, the plu-
 rality resorted to a functional analysis that treated the practical ability
 to vindicate the interests of successful litigants as the sine qua non of
 an Article Ill court. Although the Glidden plurality was willing to
 overlook the legal impotence of the Court of Claims in the face of an
 insurmountable constitutional barrier, it nevertheless insisted upon the
 ability of Article III courts to declare rights of which successful liti-
 gants could avail themselves - as a matter of practice, if not of law.
 C. Vulnerability of the Rule Against Executive Revision
 The possibility that Congress may evade the rule against executive
 revision by formally redefining the right in question raises serious
 doubt as to the utility of the rule itself. Whether a court has declared
 a right and thus rendered a decision that cannot be subject to execu-
 tive revision necessarily depends upon how Congress has defined the
 right to be judicially determined. Thus, if Congress had sought in
 Hayburn's Case to preserve executive discretion by explicitly defining
 the right at stake not as a right to a pension, but merely as a right to
 be considered by the executive for a pension, the executive's failure to
 47 370 U.S. 530 (i962).
 48 See id. at 568-7I (plurality opinion).
 49 See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 569-70.
 50 See id. at 570-7I.
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 award a pension to a successful litigant would no longer have consti-
 tuted executive revision; executive revision would instead have con-
 sisted of a statutory provision authorizing the executive to decline to
 consider the claim of a successful litigant. Yet such formal redefini-
 tion of what constitutes the right at stake places the judiciary in the
 very role that the rule against executive revision ostensibly precludes
 - that of screening claims on behalf of the executive and of placing
 the imprimatur of judicial impartiality on discretionary government
 decisions. Moreover, the situation of the litigant who sues merely to
 obtain the right to an executive decision is functionally identical to the
 'no-win situation' described above: if the litigant loses in her suit to be
 considered by the executive, she loses conclusively, but even if she
 wins, she might still lose at the discretion of the executive. Even if the
 rule against executive revision does not itself prevent such a result,
 however, courts might avoid rendering decisions in such cases by char-
 acterizing them as "advisory opinions" that cannot be rendered by Ar-
 ticle Iml courts - a doctrinally convenient approach given the
 looseness with which the Court has used that term.51
 The fact that the judiciary cannot grant the relief ultimately sought
 by a litigant, however, should not by itself render a suit nonjusticiable.
 Because the judiciary assumes an advisory role only when it is di-
 rected to decide the same question that the executive will proceed to
 decide anew, it need not refrain from participating in the intermediate
 stages of a decision as long as it resolves only questions that the execu-
 tive will not revisit. In the context of administrative law, for example,
 it is well established that the judiciary may enforce executive obser-
 vance of procedural requirements imposed by statute even though ob-
 servance of such procedures cannot dictate a particular outcome.52 In
 other cases, litigants may sue not to have the executive decide a ques-
 tion in a particular manner, but to have the executive decide a dispute
 to which the government is not a party. Such was the case in Semi-
 nole Tribe v. Florida,53 in which the Court struck down on Eleventh
 Amendment grounds a federal statute that imposed on states a duty,
 enforceable in federal court, to negotiate in good faith with Indian
 tribes seeking to conduct gaming activities.54 Arguing in dissent that
 the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Justice Stevens observed
 51 Although the Court has long insisted that Article III courts cannot render so-called "advi-
 sory opinions," see, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. I03, II3-I4
 (I948); Muskrat v. United States, 2I9 U.S. 346, 35I63 (i9ii), the precise meaning of that phrase
 is uncertain. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note I5, at 93-98 (noting the difficulty of identifying
 advisory opinions); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Moot-
 ness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 605, 644-45 (I992) (illustrating the Court's "extremely sloppy" use of the
 phrase "advisory opinions" and suggesting that perhapsas no other term of art has acquired so
 many different meanings").
 52 See, e.g., United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 4I0 U.S. 224, 234-46 (I973).
 53 ii6 S. Ct. III4 (i996).
 54 See id. at III9.
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 that the "maximum sanction" a court could impose under the statute
 for violation of the duty was "an order that refers the controversy to a
 member of the Executive Branch . . . for resolution"55 and deemed it
 "extremely doubtful that the obviously dispensable involvement of the
 judiciary in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and
 ends in the Executive Branch is a proper exercise of judicial power."56
 Yet the statute at issue in Seminole Tribe did not authorize the execu-
 tive to consider anew whether the state negotiated in good faith;
 rather, it directed the executive to prescribe procedures under which a
 tribe could conduct gaming activities.57 In determining that a state
 has failed to negotiate in good faith, the judiciary renders no advice to
 the executive on the separate question of the procedures under which
 a tribe should be allowed to conduct gaming activities. The separation
 of powers should not prevent Congress from committing the resolution
 of distinct questions within a dispute to different branches.
 IV. JUSTIFYING BENIGN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
 As A FoRm OF WAIVER
 Understood as either a denial or an assertion of judicial power, the
 rule against executive revision ought not to bar executive exercise of
 benign discretion. Any formulation of a rule against executive or legis-
 lative revision must acknowledge that the government may waive the
 benefit of a judgment in its favor. The actual effect of even a "binding
 and conclusive" judgment is limited by the fact that it falls upon the
 parties, not the court, to assert the rights that the court declares: the
 judicial power guarantees only that a successful litigant may assert its
 rights, not that it must assert them. Otherwise, any failure by the gov-
 ernment to enforce an injunction in its favor or to collect the full
 amount of a civil judgment would constitute executive or legislative
 revision of a judicial decision and thus violate the separation of pow-
 ers. Executive discretion to forgo judicially authorized searches, ar-
 rests, and prosecutions might also be deemed a form of
 unconstitutional revision.58 Yet it is well established that courts may
 55 Id. at II44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
 56 Id. at II44-45 (citing Gordon v. United States, II7 U.S. app. 697, 702-03 (i864) (posthu-
 mously reported draft opinion of Taney, C.J.), and United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (IW How.)
 40, 48 (i85I)).
 57 See Seminole Tibe, ii6 S. Ct. at II20 & n.2 (citing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
 U.S.C. ? 27io(dX7)(BXvii) (I994)).
 58 The executive is in fact obligated to exercise its discretion and to consider the validity of a
 warrant before executing it. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 9i8-2I (i984) (holding that
 evidence seized pursuant to a defective warrant must be excluded if the executive lacked an "ob-
 jectively reasonable belief' in the validity of the warrant).
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 render judgments declaring rights that the parties have yet to exercise
 and, indeed, may never exercise.59
 The Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that the govern-
 ment enjoys a particular ability to forgo the benefit of a judgment in
 its favor. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,60 for
 example, the Court held that Congress could authorize the continued
 operation of a bridge that the Court had previously held to be an ob-
 struction of interstate commerce.61 In Cherokee Nation v. United
 States,62 Pope v. United States,63 and United States v. Sioux Nation
 of Indians,64 the Court upheld statutes conferring jurisdiction on the
 Court of Claims to hear claims against the government that the Court
 of Claims had previously rejected.65 In Sioux Nation, the Court spe-
 cifically rejected arguments that such a statute amounted to legislative
 revision of judicial decisions:66 "Congress' mere waiver of the res judi-
 cata effect of a prior judicial decision rejecting the validity of a legal
 claim against the United States does not violate the doctrine of separa-
 tion of powers."67 Despite the narrow reading that the Court has since
 given Sioux Nation,68 that decision suggests that the government's
 ability to waive its rights is, at least, no less than that of a private
 litigant.
 The principle that the government may forgo the benefit of a judg-
 ment in its favor, on the one hand, and the Article III requirement
 that judgments must "affect the rights of litigants,"69 on the other,
 59 For example, a litigant may seek a declaratory judgment establishing his right to engage in
 action for which he has not been prosecuted, even when there is no guarantee that the litigant
 will ever exercise that right. See Steffel v. Thompson, 4I5 U.S. 452, 458-60 (i974).
 60 59 U.S. (i8 How.) 42I (i856).
 61 See id. at 43I-32.
 62 270 U.S. 476 (I926).
 63 323 U.S. I (944).
 64 448 U.S. 37I (I980).
 65 See id. at 39I-407; Pope, 323 U.S. at 9 (construing the statute as creating "a new obligation
 of the Government to pay ... where no obligation existed before"); Cherokee Nation, 270 U.S. at
 486 (asserting that Congress's power to waive the res judicata effect of a judgment against the
 United States "of course is clear'".
 66 See Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 391-407.
 67 Id. at 407.
 68 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., Ii5 S. Ct. I447, I458-59 & I459 n.6 (i995); infra p.
 2032 and note 77.
 69 Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 40I (0975) (quoting North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244,
 246 (097I) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the Court has adopted no
 single formulation of the conditions essential to exercise of the judicial power, its formulations
 have consistently emphasized the necessary effect of judicial decisions on the rights of individuals.
 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. I03, II3-I4 (I948) (explaining
 that Article III courts can "render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the parties');
 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 820 (i824) ("[Tlhe constitution, laws
 and treaties of the Union . . . seem designed to give the Courts of the government the construc-
 tion of all its acts, so far as they affect the rights of individuals. .. ."); Marbury v. Madison, 5
 U.S. (i Cranch) I37, I70 (I803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of
 individuals ...."). The Court has often expressed the limits of its power in the form of a rule
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 might be synthesized into the following principle: judicial decisions
 must establish rights that prevailing litigants may enforce against their
 unsuccessful opponents. Hayburn's Case and its progeny develop one
 implication of this principle: neither the executive nor the legislature
 can deny a private party its rights under a judicial decision. The prin-
 ciples that judgments must establish enforceable rights and that liti-
 gants may waive their rights frame the permissible range of executive
 or legislative action with respect to judicial decisions: although the
 government cannot upset a judgment in favor of a private party, it
 can waive the benefit of a judgment in its own favor.
 The permissible scope of executive revision can be illustrated with
 a variation on the facts of Hayburn's Case. The Invalid Pensions Act
 of I792 might be modified to the following effect: if the court finds a
 claimant eligible for a pension, the Secretary of War must pay the pen-
 sion, but if the court finds a claimant ineligible, the Secretary may
 nevertheless choose to pay the pension in order to mitigate any undue
 hardship that might otherwise result. The modified statute might also
 explicitly authorize the Secretary to exercise his discretion on the basis
 of his independent application of law to fact. Such a scheme should
 be constitutional insofar as it does not impair the ability of the judici-
 ary to declare and secure the rights of individuals. Although literalis-
 tic adherence to the principle that judgments must be final70 might
 lead to the conclusion that the Secretary could not exercise his discre-
 tion to grant a pension without violating the separation of powers,
 such a conclusion is inconsistent with the notion that the government
 may waive the benefit of a judgment in its favor. That notion necessi-
 tates a distinction between benign and nonbenign executive discretion
 - that is, a distinction between cases in which executive discretion
 nullifies a decision that favors the government, and cases in which ex-
 ecutive discretion nullifies a decision that favors some other party.
 Only executive discretion that sacrifices the government's rights may
 be characterized as a form of waiver.
 When benign executive discretion consists of the disbursement of
 money to unsuccessful litigants, as in the above variation on
 Hayburn's Case, such discretion can also be justified as a valid exer-
 cise of Congress's spending power. When the executive disburses
 money benefits at its discretion pursuant to statute,71 its role may be
 described as simply that of distributing congressional largesse to those
 against rendering so-called "advisory opinions," but this formulation is particularly unhelpful inso-
 far as it is unclear what constitutes an "advisory opinion." See supra note 5I.
 70 See Plaut, II5 S. Ct. at I453-59.
 71 Because "[n]o money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropria-
 tions made by Law," U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 9, ci. 7, any grant of a pension that is not also backed
 by a congressional appropriation would be no better than an empty promise on the part of the
 executive. Although Congress might choose to honor such a grant after it has been made, only
 Congress can bind itself in advance to do so. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569-70
 (i962) (plurality opinion) (noting that, although Article I "vests exclusive responsibility for appro-
This content downloaded from 147.8.230.158 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 01:19:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 2032 HARVARD LAW REVIEW [Vol. I09:2020
 who have lost in court. If Congress can confer on unsuccessful liti-
 gants sums of money in recognition of claims rejected by Article III
 courts, it is not clear why it cannot also direct the executive to dis-
 tribute such largesse in a discretionary manner. The fact that an Arti-
 cle Ill court has found that a person has no legal right to certain
 money should not convert a subsequent act of government charity into
 a violation of the separation of powers.
 The government's waiver of its rights under a judicial decision
 must be distinguished from its waiver of the res judicata effect of a
 judgment, which may implicate the structural independence of the
 courts. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc.,72 the Court rejected an
 effort by Congress to reinstate securities actions that had been dis-
 missed as time-barred.73 It deemed the effort a "clear violation" of the
 finality of judgments required by the separation of powers74 and pro-
 ceeded to characterize res judicata as a legal defense based on the fi-
 nality of judgments.75 Even as it acknowledged that, under Sioux
 Nation and earlier decisions, "Congress has the power to waive the res
 judicata effect of a prior judgment entered in the Government's favor
 on a claim against the United States,"76 the Court implied that courts
 always retain the ability to raise the res judicata bar sua sponte, even
 when "seemingly prohibited" from doing so by statute.77 Unlike a
 waiver of res judicata, benign executive discretion of the type under
 the extradition statute or in the above variation on Hayburn's Case
 does not require the courts to revisit previously decided issues and
 thus does not implicate the judiciary's "independent interest in
 preventing the misallocation of judicial resources and second-guessing
 prior panels of Art. m judges."78 When the executive simply grants a
 benefit or privilege denied by judicial decision, it does not also direct
 the judiciary to reconsider the unfavorable decision itself.
 priations in Congress," "a general appropriations act ... eliminates the need for subsequent sepa-
 rate appropriations to pay judgments").
 72 I I S. Ct. I447 ('995).
 73 See id. at I450-5I, I463.
 74 Id. at I456; see id. at I453 (describing the "fundamental principle" of "finality of judicial
 judgments").
 75 See id. at I459.
 76 Id. at I458-59 (quoting United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 37I, 397 (ig8o))
 (internal quotation marks omitted).
 77 Id. at I459 n.6. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia observed that the Sioux Nation
 Court "did not address" the fact that the statute at issue in that case "seemingly prohibited courts
 from raising the res judicata defense sua sponge"; nor, according to Justice Scalia, did the Court in
 Sioux Nation appear to perceive any "reason to raise the defense on its own." Id. Such "unex-
 plained silences," he explained, "lack precedential weight." Id.
 78 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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 V. JUSTIFYING BENIGN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION BY ANALOGY TO
 THE PARDON POWER
 Article II of the Constitution vests in the President the "Power to
 grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States,
 except in Cases of Impeachment."79 An aspect of English monarchical
 power deliberately retained by the Framers,80 the power to pardon is a
 sweeping one that generally cannot be checked by the other branches:
 "To the Executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is
 granted without limit."'81 A pardon is effective any time after commis-
 sion of the offense, including after conviction:82 in the words of Justice
 Holmes, a pardon "affects the judgment" that imposed the penalty.83
 When used to remit fines, penalties, and forfeitures, the pardon power
 can restore property as well as liberty;84 at the extreme, it can nullify
 the operation of a criminal statute85 or provide a means by which the
 executive may escape accountability for its actions.86 The breadth of
 79 U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 2, cl. I.
 80 See, e.g., Schick v. Reed, 4I9 U.S. 256, 262-66 (I974); THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 417
 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., ig6i); William F. Duker, The President's Power to
 Pardon: A Constitutional History, i8 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 508 ('977).
 81 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (i3 Wall.) I28, I47 (i872); see, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 263
 ("[T]he draftsmen of Art. II, ? 2, spoke in terms of a 'prerogative' of the President, which ought
 not be 'fettered or embarrassed."' (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 74 (Alexander Hamilton)); Ex
 parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (i867) ("The power ... is unlimited, with the exception
 stated [for cases of impeachment]. . .. This power of the President is not subject to legislative
 control."). Criticism of the pardon power has often taken as its premise the absence of any checks
 on its use. See, e.g., Duker, supra note 8o, at 475, 525-38; Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy
 Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 573-75, 6ii-39
 (iggi) (suggesting procedures and standards to promote "principled clemency decisions"); James N.
 Jorgensen, Note, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to Escape Ac-
 countability, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 345, 345-47, 362-67 (I993) (suggesting that President Bush may
 have pardoned various Iran-Contra defendants "in order to suppress information concerning his
 own conduct").
 Among the limits that do exist on the pardon power is that the president may not attach
 unconstitutional conditions to pardons. See, e.g., Schick, 419 U.S. at 263-64; Patrick R. Cowl-
 ishaw, Note, The Conditional Presidential Pardon, 28 STAN. L. REV. I49, I52-56, I72-77 (I975).
 Pardons also cannot "affect any rights which have vested in others" as a result of the judgment
 against the offender, and any proceeds of a sale that have been paid over to the United States as
 a result of a judgment can be returned only upon an appropriation by Congress. Knote v. United
 States, 95 U.S. I49, I54 (i877). Finally, the executive pardon power is not as exclusive as the
 Court's language in Klein might suggest: Congress enjoys the concurrent power to pass acts of
 general amnesty. See Brown v. Walker, i6i U.S. 59I, 6oi (i896).
 82 See, e.g., Garland, 7I U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380.
 83 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (I927).
 84 See, e.g., The Laura, II4 U.S. 4II, 4I3-I4 (i885); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 454,
 46I-62 (i869).
 85 See, e.g., EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT I98 (Randall W. Bland, Theodore T. Hind-
 son & Jack W. Peltason eds., 5th rev. ed. i984) (discussing President Carter's grant of amnesty to
 those who evaded conscription during the Vietnam War); Duker, supra note 80, at 530 (discussing
 President Jefferson's announced course of pardoning those convicted under the Sedition Act).
 86 See Duker, supra note 80, at 530-33 (discussing President Ford's pardon of Richard
 Nixon); Jorgensen, supra note 8i, at 362-67 (discussing President Bush's pardon of various Iran-
 Contra defendants).
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 the power can be illustrated by comparison to a statute authorizing
 the Attorney General to set free any person convicted of a federal
 crime if she determines that to do so would be in the national interest:
 in light of the executive's established power to grant amnesties with-
 out legislative consent,87 such a statute would seem merely to dupli-
 cate the explicit grant of power found in Article II.
 The existence and breadth of the pardon power demonstrate that
 the Framers endorsed the notion of executive power to confer liberty
 and property to which the recipient has no legal right. The explicit
 assignment of such power to the executive does not violate the consti-
 tutional scheme of separated powers but is rather an integral part of
 that scheme.88 The Court has recognized the value and necessity of
 the power as a check on judicial decisionmaking: "It is a check en-
 trusted to the executive for special cases. To exercise it to the extent
 of destroying the deterrent effect of judicial punishment would be to
 pervert it; but whoever is to make it useful must have full discretion
 to exercise it."89 For that reason, the Court has upheld exercises of the
 pardon power even at the particular expense of the judiciary. For ex-
 ample, although the power of contempt is "[t]he power of a court to
 protect itself'90 and "to vindicate the authority of the court,"91 the ex-
 ecutive has the power to pardon criminal contempts.92 And insofar as
 a pardon "affects the judgment" that imposes a penalty, pardons them-
 selves amount to constitutionally sanctioned executive revision of judi-
 cial decisions.
 At the same time, because Article II guarantees only that the exec-
 utive shall have the power to pardon "Offenses against the United
 States," the pardon power alone may not formally justify all forms of
 benign executive discretion. If failure to qualify for a pension does not
 constitute an "Offense[] against the United States," for example, it is
 unclear how the executive grant of a pension could be justified en-
 tirely as an act of pardon; nor do the Court's pardon decisions suggest
 any obvious precedent for such use of the pardon power. Moreover,
 given the constitutional requirement that "[n]o Money shall be drawn
 from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by
 87 See Armstrong v. United States, 8o U.S. (IW Wall.) I54, I55-56 (i872); Duker, supra note
 80, at 5I9.
 88 See Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (I927) ("[A pardon] is a part of the Constitutional
 scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate authority that the public welfare
 will be better served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.").
 89 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 12I (I925).
 90 Id. at I22.
 91 Id. at iiI.
 92 See id. at i08-22. The Court has distinguished "criminal contempts," which are imposed
 "to vindicate the authority of the court and to deter other like derelictions," from "civil con-
 tempts," which are imposed "for the benefit of the complainant" in a civil suit. Id. at iII. The
 Court has held only the first category of contempts susceptible to pardon. See id.
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 Law,"93 the executive cannot unilaterally obligate the United States to
 honor such a grant.94 Thus, at least in cases involving the disburse-
 ment of money, congressional approval may be not merely relevant,
 but decisive as to the constitutionality of benign executive discretion.
 Even if the absence of congressional approval is fatal to certain
 types of benign executive discretion, however, the presence of such ap-
 proval should sustain the discretion. If the executive pardon power
 standing alone cannot formally justify every executive exercise of be-
 nign discretion, that power must still be combined with all of Con-
 gress's concurrent authority when Congress directs the executive to
 exercise such discretion. As Justice Jackson observed in Youngstown
 Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,95 executive power waxes and wanes with
 the presence or absence of congressional approval: "When the Presi-
 dent acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,
 his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in
 his own right plus all that Congress can delegate."96 Thus, because
 Congress enjoys broad and unquestioned spending power,97 a statute
 directing the executive to exercise benign discretion in granting pen-
 sions can be justified not only by analogy to the pardon power, but
 also as a legislative direction to execute the charitable will of Congress
 in individual cases.98 If the grant of a pension falls within a "zone of
 twilight" in which the scope of executive power standing alone is un-
 clear,99 the fact that Congress has directed the executive to exercise
 benign discretion should be relevant, if not decisive, as support.
 More generally, the justifications of benign executive discretion of-
 fered in Part IV and in this Part should be viewed not as mutually
 exclusive, but as cumulative. Combined executive and congressional
 power may be further combined with the notion that the government
 may waive its rights as additional support for executive exercise of
 benign discretion. Thus, for example, as support for its holding in
 Sioux Nation, the Court combined precedent establishing Congress's
 power to waive res judicata with Congress's enumerated power to de-
 fine and "to pay the Debts . . . of the United States."100 Executive
 exercise of benign discretion enjoys the support not only of the govern-
 ment's ability to waive its rights under a judgment in its favor, but
 93 U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 9, cl. 7.
 94 See supra note 7I.
 95 343 U.S. 579 (I952).
 96 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
 97 See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 397 (ig80) (noting "a
 substantial body of precedent affirming the broad constitutional power of Congress to define and
 'to pay the Debts . . . of the United States"' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. i)).
 98 See supra p. 2031-32.
 99 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
 100 Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 397 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cl. i); see also id. at 40I
 (noting the Court's, similar approach in Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. I, 9-I0 (i944)).
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 also of the executive's explicit power of grace and any additional pow-
 ers that Congress may exercise.
 VI. JUSTICIABILITY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS CHALLENGES TO
 BENIGN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
 In order to invoke the "judicial Power" of the federal courts, a
 plaintiff must allege a "Case[ ]" or "ControversLy]" within the meaning
 of Article III.'0' In elaborating these limits, the Court has articulated
 a constitutional doctrine of standing that requires plaintiffs to allege
 an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized,"'02 "distinct
 and palpable,"''03 and "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypo-
 thetical.""1104 The requirement of injury would appear to preclude sep-
 aration of powers challenges to benign executive discretion: it is not
 apparent how the threatened exercise of benign discretion - the
 threatened conferral of liberty or property to which the recipient has
 no legal right - could inflict injury adequate for standing purposes.
 The Court has indicated that the separation of powers may go unen-
 forced when its violation does not result in individual injury.'05
 101 U.S. CONST. art. m, ? 2, C1. I.
 102 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (I992).
 103 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 75I (i984) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell-
 wood, 44I U.S. 9I, I00 (I979) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 50I (I975))).
 104 Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. I49, I55
 (i990) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 46i U.S. 95, I02 (I983))). Plaintiffs must also
 demonstrate that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," Si-
 mon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 4I (I976), and that it "is likely to be
 redressed by a favorable decision," id. at 38.
 105 See Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 4I8 U.S. 208, 2I7-27 (I974); Ex parte IAvitt,
 302 U.S. 633, 633-34 (I937) (per curiam). In Schlesinger, the Court denied standing to armed
 forces reservists who alleged that members of Congress belonged to the reserves in violation of
 the Incompatibility Clause and were subject as a result of their reserve membership to "undue
 influence by the Executive Branch, in violation of ... the independence of Congress implicit in
 Art. I." Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 2I2 (footnote omitted); see id. at 209-I2. The Incompatibility
 Clause provides that "no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member
 of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 6, cl. 2. The Court held
 that the alleged injury to "an interest . .. held in common by all members of the public" was too
 "abstract" to sustain standing to sue, Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 220, and explicitly rejected the
 suggestion that the absence of others who might successfully assert standing to enforce the Incom-
 patibility Clause could itself justify a finding of standing. See id. at 227. In LUvitt, the Court
 denied standing to a member of the Supreme Court bar who alleged that the appointment of
 Hugo Black to the Court violated the Incompatibility Clause because Black had served in the
 Senate at the same time that Congress had increased the retirement pay of Supreme Court jus-
 tices. See id. at 2I9-20 (discussing Livitt). The Incompatibility Clause provides that "[n]o Sena-
 tor or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
 Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emolu-
 ments whereof shall have been encreased during such time." U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 6, cl. 2. The
 Court relied upon the "established principle" that an individual seeking to invoke the judicial
 power "must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury"
 as a result of the challenged action; "a general interest common to all members of the public" was
 "not sufficient." LUvitt, 302 U.S. at 634.
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 Standing doctrine cannot prevent courts from considering the con-
 stitutionality of benign executive discretion, however, insofar as an al-
 legation of executive revision is also an objection to subject matter
 jurisdiction to which a court must respond.106 Because Article III
 courts cannot render decisions subject to executive revision, the fact of
 executive revision not only renders a statute unconstitutional, but also
 deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, although indi-
 viduals facing extradition face an imminent loss of liberty that would
 constitute an obvious injury for standing purposes, they cannot logi-
 cally be required to establish standing in order to allege executive revi-
 sion for the simple reason that they attempt not to invoke the judicial
 power, but to resist its exercise. Moreover, even if neither the govern-
 ment nor the litigant objects to the presence of benign executive dis-
 cretion in a statute, a court can still establish the unconstitutionality of
 such discretion by deciding sua sponte that it lacks subject matter ju-
 risdiction under the statute - an approach demonstrated by
 Hayburn's Case itself.
 VII. CONCLUSION
 Even when it results in what might be characterized as executive
 revision of a judicial decision, executive exercise of benign discretion
 poses no threat to the separation of powers. Application of the rule
 against executive revision to cases involving benign executive discre-
 tion is necessary neither to preserve judicial independence from the
 executive nor to ensure the ability of the judiciary to vindicate the
 rights of successful litigants. Efforts to analogize the exercise of such
 discretion to classic cases of impermissible executive revision must
 contend not only with the principle that the government may deny
 itself the benefit of a judicial determination, but also with the textual
 warrant for benign executive discretion provided by the pardon power.
 The unfortunate case of officers Lobue and Kulekowskis suggests not
 that benign executive discretion ought to be unconstitutional, but
 rather that there arise occasions calling for its exercise.
 106 Parties cannot waive objections to subject matter jurisdiction, and courts must raise such
 objections sua sponte if the parties fail to do so. See, e.g., FED. R CIV. P. I2(hX3); Louisville &
 N.R.R. v. Mottley, 2 I I U.S. I49, I52 (igo8).
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